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NOTE
NAACP v. Detroit Police Officers Association-The Demarcation of Title VII
And The Fourteenth Amendment in Employment Discrimination
INTRODUCTION
Affirmative action, preferential treatment given to one group of people
to remedy a particular disadvantage, has increasingly come under fire in
recent years. Affirmative action has consistently been used as a remedial
measure in employment discrimination litigation.1 For example, affirma-
tive action programs have been used to remedy gross racial imbalances in
certain job situations where the "underrepresented" race has effectively
proven that the imbalance was due to racially discriminatory practices.
While admitting past racially discriminatory acts, the "overrepresented"
race sometimes will contend that a particular affirmative action program
is invalid, because such program discriminates against them. The ques-
tion then becomes whether all types of racial discrimination, either be-
nign or invidious, should be held unconstitutional.
In July 1984, the United States District Court, Eastern District of
Michigan, decided NAACP v. Detroit Police Officers Association (DPOA
I1).2 The court was asked to decide whether the City of Detroit violated
the fourteenth amendment by laying-off large numbers of black police
officers pursuant to a seniority clause provision.3 It held that numerical
employment goals4 established as a result of prior findings of racial dis-
1. Affirmative action applies to sex as well as to race. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17 (1982).
2. 591 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
3. Id at 1196.
4. "Affirmative action concentrates on goals and ratios and not on quotas." CITIZENS'
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION TO OPEN THE DoORs OF JOB OPPORTUNITY-
A POLICY OF FAIRNESS AND COMPASSION THAT HAS WORKED 69 (1984) (hereinafter cited as
CITIZENS' COMM'N).
Goals are ... numerical objectives fixed realistically in terms of the number of vacancies ex-
pected, and the number of qualified applicants available in the relevant job market. Thus, if
through no fault of the employer, he has fewer vacancies than expected, he is not subject to
sanction because he is not expected to displace existing employees or to hire unneeded employ-
ees to meet his goal. Similarly, if he has demonstrated every good faith effort to include persons
from the group being considered for selection, but has been unable to do so in sufficient numbers
to meet his goal, he is not subject to sanction.
Id. at 58 (quoting Permissible Goals and Timetables in State and Local Government Employment
Practices 3-4 (March 23, 1973) (unpublished memorandum)).
A hiring ratio is ... a numerically expressed estimate of the number or percentage of new
employees expressed as a ratio... In practice, the ratio remedy is more vigorous than a goal
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crimination may override bona fide seniority plans.' DPOA II is an
equal protection decision.
The court rejected the City's contention that Firefighters Local Union
No. 1784 v. Stotts6 was controlling.' Stotts is a title VII8 case which
involved a consent decree that disclaimed liability for past discrimina-
tion. Stotts is the only decision rendered by the Supreme Court address-
ing the issue of whether numerical hiring goals can override bona fide
seniority systems over the objections of public employers, under title VII.
In Stotts the Court held in the negative. 9
DPOA 11 addresses several questions unanswered by Stotts.'0 The first
such question is whether a public employer may voluntarily override its
bona fide seniority system, pursuant to the fourteenth amendment, in an
attempt to eradicate the vestiges of past or present racial discrimination.
The DPOA 11 court indirectly addressed this issue by discussing the inap-
plicability of Stotts to similar cases involving liability under the Constitu-
tion.11 Moreover, the fact that the court upheld a voluntary affirmative
action program negotiated by the City of Detroit, 12 is tantamount to an
affirmative reply to this first question. The second question is whether a
court may cause a consent decree to override a bona fide seniority system
over the objections of a party to the action, pursuant to the equal protec-
tion clause. 3 In answering this question, DPOA H1 held that a court may
cause consent debrees, entered into pursuant to court findings of four-
teenth amendment violations, to override bona fide seniority systems.
because it focuses on each hiring decision rather than on the overall results achieved over time
by hiring practices... Failure of an employer to achieve a hiring ratio, in and of itself, does not
subject the employer to sanctions.
CITIZENS' COMM'N, supra at 68.
Quotas are absolute requirements that impose a fixed number or percentage which must be at-
tained, or which cannot be exceeded. The number to be attained is fixed without regard to the
number of potential qualified applicants. Failure to achieve a desired quota will subject an employer
to sanctions, regardless of whether the quota was initially unrealistic, insufficient vacancies existed,
or qualified applicants were scant. CITIZENS' COMM'N, supra note 4, at 59.
5. DPOA II, 591 F. Supp. at 1202. A bona fide seniority system is: (1) one wherein its provi-
sions are neutral on their face as to race; and, (2) neutral as to race in the administration of its
seniority awards. Kromnick v. School Dist., 739 F.2d 894, 911 (3d Cir. 1984), cert denied, 105 S.
Ct. 782 (1985).
6. 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984). "[TIhe United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in... Stotts
during the trial of [DPOA I]." DPOA II, 591 F. Supp. at 1202.
7. DPOA II, 591 F. Supp. at 1202.
8. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-716, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
9. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2590.
10. The question expressly left open in Stotts, and not addressed in DPOA II, was whether in
attempting to eradicate the vestige of past racial discrimination, a public employer may lawfully
adopt a voluntary affirmative action plan that is race-conscious in its application and remedial in its
nature. Id.
11. DPOA 11, 591 F. Supp. at 1202-04.
12. Id. at 1197.
13. The Supreme Court in Stotts hinted at the possible implied constitutional questions. Stotts,
104 S. Ct. at 2590 n.16.
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Judge Gilmore stated, "This case involves liability under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Title VII contains a clause specifically exempting bona fide
seniority systems from attack. The Fourteenth Amendment contains no
such restrictions." 14
This Note will focus on the shrinking legal battlefield upon which the
fight against racial discrimination in employment traditionally has been
waged. 5 The sole concern here is with numerical relief 6 enforcement
pursuant to the fourteenth amendment. The goal herein is to highlight
the reasons why Stotts is not controlling in a fourteenth amendment situ-
ation such as DPOA II. Part I of this Note analyzes DPOA 1I. Part II
surveys the origins of numerically expressed affirmative action enforce-
ment and the history of title VII. Part III addresses the question
whether a demarcation has occurred between title VII and fourteenth
amendment modes of enforcing numerical relief. This Note concludes
that Stotts does not control in a DPOA II (equal protection) situation.
I. THE HISTORY BEHIND DPOA II
In 1974, Detroit, Michigan adopted a voluntary affirmative action plan
(Detroit Plan) for its police department which called for a fifty-fifty,
black-white ratio in hiring and promotions for its police force. 7 In 1978,
the Detroit Police Officers Association (DPOA) and several white police
officers challenged the validity and constitutionality of the Detroit Plan.
DPOA alleged, inter alia, that the Detroit Plan violated title VII and the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan agreed with the
DPOA, holding the Detroit Plan invalid pursuant to title VII and uncon-
stitutional pursuant to the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The court enjoined continued use of the Detroit Plan."a
14. DPOA I, 591 F. Supp. at 1202.
15. The Departments of Labor and Justice and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC) have the major responsibility for enforcing federal affirmative action policy in employ-
ment. During Reagan's tenure as President, the departments' enforcement resources previously used
to implement the policy have been weakened. CmIZENS' COMM'N, supra note 4, at 89. Although its
effectiveness has been severely hampered, the EEOC is the only federal enforcement agency that has
remained totally faithful to the principles of affirmative action developed over the past twenty years.
Id. at 96-97.
16. The term numerical relief will be used interchangeably throughout this Note with the terms
"hiring goals," and "hiring ratios." Numerical relief in this context does not mean quota, although
some courts use the term loosely, allowing "quota" to represent numerical relief. See generally Cm-
ZENS' COMM'N, supra note 4.
17. See generally Baker v. City of Detroit, 483 F. Supp. 930, 940-52 (E.D. Mich. 1979), aft'd
sub nom. Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984).
This was one of Detroit's many desegregation reforms adopted after the 1967 riots. It became evi-
dent to the City that its severe, racially imbalanced, segregated police force was unacceptable to the
community such force served. Baker, 483 F. Supp. at 940-52.
18. See generally Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 446 F. Supp. 979 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
3
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On October 12, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district
court in Detroit Police Officers Association v. Young." The court held
that the Detroit Plan did not violate title VII or the equal protection
clause as found by the district court. The court remanded the case for
further consideration of the constitutional issues.2" On October 1, 1979,
eleven days before the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals rendered its deci-
sion in Young, the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Michigan decided Baker v. City of Detroit.2 Baker involved the lieu-
tenant's and sergeant's police associations and individual white police of-
ficers' challenge to the Detroit Plan. Their challenge, based upon title
VII and equal protection theories was rejected.22 the court upheld the
Detroit Plan. On appeal in 1979, the Sixth Circuit, in Bratton v. City of
Detroit,23 affirmed Baker. The Bratton court espoused several factors
which are important in a court's consideration of whether a particular
affirmative action program is constitutionally sound. Judge Jones, writ-
ing for the court, stated in substance that: (1) if there is a need for the
remedial measures; (2) if the government has an interest in the remedial
measures' implementation;24 and (3) if the remedial measures are reason-
able,25 then the particular affirmative action program is constitutionally
sound. Judge Jones found the Baker affirmative action plan to be consti-
tutionally sound.26
In 1979 and 1980, the City of Detroit implemented large-scale layoffs
of city employees. Detroit laid off approximately 1,100 police officers.
Seventy-five percent of those laid off were black.27
On February 22, 1984, the NAACP and a class of black police officers,
among others, sued the City of Detroit in federal district court.28 The
plaintiffs in DPOA I claimed that the defendant violated the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment when defendant laid off the
19. 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981).
20. See generally id.
21. 483 F. Supp. 930 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
22. See generally id.
23. 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1983).
24. Id. at 886.
25. Id. at 887. The Bratton court further stated that the question-whether the remedial meas-
ures are reasonable-"includes an examination of (1) whether any discrete group or individual is
stigmatized by the program and, (2) whether racial classifications have been reasonably used in light
of the program's objectives." Id. (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 372-76
(1978); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 193 (1979)).
26. Bratton, 704 F.2d at 897-98. Compare the Bratton factors with the Brennan factors dis-
cussed infra in the text accompanying note 96.
27. NAACP v. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n, 591 F. Supp. at 1197.
28. DPOA I is an unreported decision, but the decision is discussed in Id. at 1199. This racial
employment discrimination action was brought "by the Detroit Branch of the NAACP, The Guardi-
ans, Inc., and ten named individual black police officers against the City of Detroit, its mayor, its
police department, its police commissioners, its police chief, the Detroit Police Officers Association
(DPOA), and David Watroba, President of the DPOA." Id. at 1196.
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plaintiff class of black police officers. The district court awarded plain-
tiffs a partial summary judgment on the equal protection issue.2 9
The United States Supreme Court handed down a title VII decision in
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts3" on June 12, 1984. Stotts
involved an appeal initiated by Firefighters Local Union No. 1784
(Union) and several white firemen who had been laid off pursuant to a
federal district court modification of an affirmative action program.
31
Memphis, Tennessee, adopted a voluntary affirmative action plan
(Memphis Plan) which was part of a consent decree entered into out-of-
court without any findings or admissions of racial discrimination. The
Memphis Plan was void of provisions that allowed for layoffs, reductions
in rank, or competitive seniority.
After the Memphis Plan had been entered into, the City of Memphis
experienced a budgetary shortfall promoting a layoff of some of the
City's employees, including firemen. A seniority system that applied to
all of the City's employees was already in existence. Memphis attempted
to use the seniority system32 in determining which firemen would be laid
off. Pursuant to a petition, by Stotts, a black fireman, and others simi-
larly situated, the district court enjoined the City from following the sen-
iority system. The court reasoned that the operation of the seniority
system would have a racially discriminatory effect.33 The Sixth Circuit
affirmed the district court, while holding the seniority system to be bona
fide.34
On appeal, the Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals hold-
ing that the seniority system was bona fide; however, on every other
point the Court reversed. The Court held that a consent decree, entered
into out-of-court without any findings or admissions of racial discrimina-
tion, cannot override a bona fide seniority system pursuant to title VII.3 5
The Court did not address any constitutional issues. Justice White, writ-
ing for a divided Court, expressly left open the question whether a public
employer may legally engage in voluntary race conscious relief pursuant
to title VII.
36
On July 25, 1984, the United States District Court, Eastern District of
Michigan, decided NAACP v. Detroit Police Officers Association. 7 DPOA
29. Id. at 1199. The district court based its decision upon the findings of intentional past dis-
crmination against blacks in the Detroit Police Department previously found in Baker. Id.
30. 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 2581.
33. The seniority system provided that in the event of layoffs the last hired, would be the first
fired. Id.
34. Id. at 2582. The district court found also that the seniority system was not bona fide. Id.
35. Id. at 2582-83.
36. Id. at 2585-90.
37. 591 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Mich. 1984).
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11 is the judicial end-result of Detroit, Michigan's gamble38 during a
budgetary crisis which began in 1979."9 The City's large-scale layoffs of
its employees effected the layoff of Detroit police officers below the rank
of sergeant.' The police officers were laid off pursuant to article 10(e) of
the collective bargaining agreement between the Detroit Police Officers
Association (DPOA) and the City. Article 10(e) included a seniority
clause which required seniority to be strictly applied in the event of lay-
offs.41 An overwhelming majority of black police officers employed by
the City before the layoffs in 1979 had been hired pursuant to a voluntary
affirmative action plan initiated by the City in 1974.42
The plaintiffs43 argued that the defendant City's adherence to the stric-
tures of article 10(e)'s seniority clause" violated the City's affirmative
duties imposed by prior findings of constitutional violations in Baker.
The courts in Baker and Bratton both found that the City of Detroit
"employed a consistent overt policy of intentional discrimination against
blacks in all phases of its operations," within the police department at
least until 1968.4" However, Baker and Bratton concerned suits by white
officers challenging the City's voluntary affirmative action plan.46 There-
38. Id.
39. "[Ihe City concedes: ... they (the city defendants) clearly would have preferred to depart
from seniority based layoffs, yet chose not to because they believed that a court would be more likely
to award back pay to prevailing white plaintiffs than it would to prevailing black plaintiffs." Id. at
1202 n.8. The City's political wisdom paid off. The court stated:
The wrong in this case was ... individual discrimination. It was also a collective wrong, a
wrong to the expectations of the citizenry and the black police of the City of Detroit... The
collective interests outweigh the admittedly important private interest in back pay ... and merit
denial of back pay. In view of the fact that the violation here was to the collective interests of
the laid-off officers and the citizens of Detroit, this court believes justice will not be served by a
massive back pay award, and therefore, back pay will be denied.
Id. at 1209-10.
40. Id. at 1197.
41. Id. "On October 13, 1979, the City laid off 400 police officers, of whom 71 percent were
black and in 1980 an additional 690 police officers were laid off, 75 percent of whom were black."
Id.
42. Id. "The first collective bargaining agreement between the DPOA and the City of Detroit
was entered into in 1967. A seniority clause was bargained in at that time, and this clause has
remained in effect in all agreements since." Id. at 1198.
43. The affirmative action program resulted in an accelerated hiring rate for blacks in the
Detroit Police Department (DPD). In 1975, out of 393 appointments to the... [DPD], 250 or
63 percent, were black. In 1976, there were no appointments. In 1977, out of 1,245 appoint-
ments, 949, or 76 percent, were black, and in 1978, the last year in which hiring has taken place
in the ... [DPD], out of 227 appointments, 179, or 78 percent, were black.
Id. at 1197. "In 1967... the City of Detroit was 40% black and the Detroit Police Department was
only 6% black." Id. at 1199. On December 31, 1978 blacks held 34.6% of the total positions in the
department. Id. at 1197.
44. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
45. The City's adherence to the seniority clause provisions reduced the total number of blacks
in the police department to twenty-eight percent. DPOA II, 591 F. Supp. at 1197. Thus, the 1979
and 1980 layoffs wiped out most of the 1978 affirmative action recruiting of blacks. Id.
46. Id. at 1199. In Baker the court found, inter alia, that: (1) in 1967 the City of Detroit was
40% black, but the Detroit Police Department (DPD) was only six percent black; (2) before 1967
6
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fore, neither court was required to find that the City's past overt acts of
intentional and invidious discrimination were in violation of the four-
teenth amendment. 7 Because the Baker and Bratton courts did not spe-
cifically state that a fourteenth amendment violation was found, the City
argued that the court should reconsider its February 22, 1984, award of
partial summary judgment for plaintiffs.48
In DPOA II, as in DPOA I, the district court found for the plaintiffs,
holding that the City had notice4 9 of the judicial findings of past discrimi-
nation as of October 1, 1979, when the Baker opinion was issued."0
Therefore, Judge Gilmore reasoned, due to the City's knowledge of its
affirmative obligation to eliminate the continuing effects of past racial
discrimination, the City breached its affirmative duty in 1979 during its
massive layoff of black officers. 1 Moreover, during the trial, City offi-
cials admitted that the police department had intentionally discriminated
against blacks in the past. 2
The City argued that its obligation to the DPOA under article 10(e)'s
seniority clause was unclear in 1979." The court curtly dismissed the
the DPD was segregated, (a) blacks were assigned to patrol exclusively black areas, (b) scout cars
were segregated, and (c) almost every phase of the police department's operation, from patrols to
investigations to supervisory functions, was segregated; and (3) this discrimination had very harmful
effects upon relations between the police and the black community, (a) observers characterized the
relationship as one of deep hostility, (b) the City's riots of 1943 and 1967 have been intimately
associated with this mass of hostility. Id. at 1199-1200.
47. Id. at 1199. The voluntary alfirmative action plan basically ensured that an equal number
of white and black officers would be promoted from the rank of sergeant to lieutenant. The previous
promotional plan did not use race as a factor but used other factors that consistently kept an over-
whelming majority of the black candidates at the non-promotional end of the eligibility list. Baker,
483 F. Supp. at 936. See also Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979),
cert denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1981).
48. DPOA I, 591 F. Supp. at 1199. Because "[t]he record in Baker is 'replete with evidence'
... of invidious racial discrimination against blacks in the Detroit Police Department.. ." there was
no need for the Baker or Bratton court to state that the evidence proved a violation of the fourteenth
amendment. Id. (citations omitted). "[Tihe fourteenth amendment... prohibits all invidious racial
discrimination." Id. (citations omitted).
49. Id. at 1201. On February 22, 1984, the district court found that Detroit's police depart-
ment had engaged in invidious racial discrimination against blacks. Id. at 1199.
50. Detroit Mayor Young's letter to David Watroba, President of the DPOA, estops the de-
fendants from effectively asserting a defense of lack of notice at the time of the 1979 layoffs. Id. at
1201. The letter reads in part:
In closing, let me remind you that affirmative action as a concept is not negotiable. It is man-
dated not only by the City Charter, but also by state and federal law and the courts as well.
It is also my opinion that the duty to implement affirmative action does not stop just because we
have found more equitable ways to hire new police officers. Rather, we have a double duty-and
we are now challenged to find equitable ways to implement the September 5 layoffs.
The fact that we have found ways to remove hiring barriers at the front door does not relieve us
of our obligation to find ways to remove comparable barriers at the back door, now that the
circumstances require it.
Id.
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City's contention. Judge Gilmore stated, "It is well established that good
faith is not a defense by a municipality to a constitutional violation."54
The City further argued that Stotts is mandatory authority, holding that
an affirmative action plan cannot override a bona fide seniority system in
the event of layoffs." The court found that Stotts was not controlling
because that case involved only title VII which specifically provides an
exemption for bona fide seniority clauses. 6 Judge Gilmore stated further
that "Stotts involved a consent decree that specifically disclaimed liability
for past discrimination. [DPOA I1] ... involves prior judicial determina-
tions of past intentional discrimination."5 " In summation, the court
stated that DPOA 11 involves only fourteenth amendment interpretations
which contain neither seniority clause exemptions nor defenses for con-
tractual obligations. 8 The court reaffirmed its February 22, 1984, deter-
mination that the City breached its affirmative obligations, thus violating
plaintiffs' fourteenth amendment rights.5 9
II. BACKGROUND
A. Origins of Numerical Relief Enforcement
The Supreme Court and lower federal courts have used a trilogy of
Court decisions when ascertaining the validity of a particular numerical
relief remedy.' This trilogy is composed of Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke,6" United Steelworkers v. Weber,6" and, Fullilove v.
54. Id. at 1201. Article 10(e) is the collective bargaining agreement between DPOA and the
City which included a provision requiring the article's seniority clause to be applied in the event of
layoffs. Id. at 1198.
55. Id. at 1201. The court stated further that "parties cannot by contract limit their liability for
preexisting constitutional violation." Id.
56. Id. at 1202-03.
57. Id. For post-DPOA II cases holding that Stotts does not prohibit modification of all consent
decrees, see Vanguards v. City of Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479 (6th Cir.), cert granted sub nom. Local
Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 59 (1985); EEOC v. Local 638,
753 F.2d 1172 (2d Cir.), cerL granted sub nom. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, v.
EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 58 (1985); Van Aken v. Young, 50 F.2d 43 (6th Cir. 1984); Wygant v. Jackson Bd.
of Educ., 746 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985); Janowiak v. Corporate
City of South Bend, 750 F.2d 557 (7th Cir. 1984)petition for cert fileds 54 U.S.L.W. 3016 (U.S. July
16, 1985).
58. DPOA II, 591 F. Supp. at 1202.
59. Id. at 1201-02.
60. Id. at 1203-04. Although the plaintiffs prevailed in DPOA Il on the substantive issues the
court was very reserved on the question of possible remedies. The court granted reinstatement but
denied the plaintiffs a back-pay remedy basing the denial upon equitable grounds. See supra note 41
and accompanying text.
Subsequent to the decision rendered in DPOA H, Judge Gilmore ordered a recall of all laid off
black officers and any laid off white officer possessing greater seniority than the black officer with the
lowest seniority. See NAACP, Detroit Branch v. DPOA, 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 434
(E.D. Mich. 1984).
61. South Fla. Chapter ETC. v. Metropolitan Dade City, 552 F. Supp. 909, 928-29 (1982),
modified, 723 F.2d 846 (11th Cir. 1984).
8




The first case of this trilogy was Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke.' 4 In Bakke, a white male challenged an admissions program
adopted by the medical school of the University of California at Davis
(UCD). 65  The admissions program consisted of a total of one hundred
seats reserved for the total incoming class." Out of the available one
hundred seats, sixteen were set aside for economically and/or education-
ally disadvantaged minorities.67 Thus, white applicants could compete
for only eighty-four seats while minority applicants could compete for
each of the one hundred seats.68 After two unsuccessful attempts to gain
admission, despite his high scores on the admissions criteria, Bakke filed
suit alleging that UCD's special admissions program operated to exclude
him on the basis of race, thus violating his equal protection rights under
the fourteenth amendment.69 UCD argued that the special admissions
program was constitutional and necessary to the safeguarding of the
school's interests.
70
In the Court's plurality opinion,71 Justice Powell agreed that a state
may use race as a factor in its school admissions programs. However, the
"State must show that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally per-
missible and substantial, and that its use of the classification is 'necessary
... to the accomplishment' of its purpose or the safeguarding of its inter-
est."' 72 Justice Powell held UCD's interest of countering the effects of
societal discrimination invalid73 because there had been no finding of ra-
62. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
63. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
64. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
65. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
66. Id. at 269.
67. Id. at 272. The "program" was really two separate and distinct admissions programs. The
regular program contained a cutoff at 2.5 on a 4.0 grade point average. The special program did not
have a 2.5 cutoff and did not compare special with regular program applicants. Id. at 273-75.
68. Id. Minority included Blacks, Chicanos, Asians, and American Indians. Id.
69. Id. at 289.
70. Id. at 277-78.
71. Id. at 305-06. UCD's stated interests safeguarded by the admissions program are: (1) "re-
ducing the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in medical schools and in the medical
profession; (2) countering the effects of societal discrimination; (3) increasing the number of physi-
cians who will practice in communities currently underserved; and, (4) obtaining the educational
benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse student body." Id.
Justice Powell found UCD's first and third stated interests to be invalid. Id. at 310-11.
72. Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion, wherein he allowed race to be used as a factor in
establishing affirmative action programs. Id. at 314-15, 317-18 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice
Brennan wrote an opinion concurring with Justice Powell's determination that race could be used as
a factor in affirmative action programs. Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and White joined. Id. at 324-
26 (Brennan, J., concurring, dissenting in part). Justice Powell's opinion used a stricter standard of
review than Justice Brennan's, therefore, Justice Powell's opinion is considered to be controlling.
73. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 305 (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1966)).
303 ,
9
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cial discrimination by a competent body.74 He further stated that
although UCD had a valid and substantial interest in wanting to obtain
the educational benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse student
body,7 5 the school's special admissions program was still invalid.
76 Jus-
tice Powell reasoned that the program's fatal flaw was its disregard of
individual rights as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.77 In other
words, the special admissions program used race as the only factor and
not one of many factors.7' The Court held that Bakke was entitled to be
admitted into UCD. Although UCD's special admissions program was
invalid, UCD could use race as a factor in a properly devised admissions
program.79
The second case in the trilogy is United Steelworkers v. Weber.8"
Weber did not involve a constitutional issue but rather an interpretation
of a statute.81 The controversy involved a voluntary collective bargaining
agreement between Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation (Kaiser)
and the United Steelworkers of America (Union).82 The agreement be-
tween Kaiser and the Union contained an affirmative action program
which covered terms and conditions of employment at fifteen Kaiser
plants.83 It was designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalances in
the plants.84
Because blacks had been excluded from craft unions, only five blacks
out of 273 skilled craftworkers were employed at the Gramercy plant
prior to 1974. Gramercy's work force was thirty-nine percent black.85
Because of this gross racial imbalance, Kaiser and the Union agreed to
create an in-plant training program. As a result, selection of craft train-
ees was'made on the basis of seniority. 6 The agreement provided for a
temporary new-trainee ratio wherein the new craftworker trainees were
to be composed of a group of at least fifty percent black. The new-trainee
ratio was to remain in effect until the Gramercy plant's percentage of
74. Id. at 309. Justice Powell stated, "A government body must have the authority and capa-
bility to establish, in the record, that the classification is responsive to identified discrimination." Id.
75. Id. at 301, 305, 309. The competent body may be a court, legislature or a responsible
administrative agency. Id. at 301, 305.
76. Id. at 311-12.
77. Id. at 320.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 315-19.
80. Id. at 320.
81. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). Assistant Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds has declared
his intention to seek a reversal of Weber, because in his opinion Weber was wrongly decided. Crri-
ZENS' COMM'N, supra note 4, at 100 (citing The Wall St. J., Dec. 8, 1981, at 1, col. 1).
82. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-716, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982). The sections
referred to here are the unlawful employment practices section of the Act, comprising title VII.
83. Weber, 443 U.S. at 197-98.
84. Id. at 198.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 198-99.
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black skilled craftworkers approximated the percentage of blacks in the
labor force.8 7 Thirteen craft trainees, seven black and six white, were
selected from Gramercy's production work force during the first year of
Kaiser's affirmative action plan. The black selected with the most senior-
ity was junior to several white workers who were rejected.88 Shortly
thereafter, Weber, a white worker filed suit alleging that Kaiser's affirma-
tive action plan discriminated against him and violated section 703(a)
and (d) of title VII.89 The lower federal courts agreed with Weber and
permanently enjoined Kaiser from further use of the plan.90 Weber ar-
gued that Congress intended to prohibit all race-conscious affirmative ac-
tion plans when title VII was enacted. 91
However, on appeal the Supreme Court disagreed with the lower
court. The Court held that "Congress did not intend to prohibit the pri-
vate sector from taking effective steps to accomplish the goal that Con-
gress designed Title VII to achieve."92 The Court stated that section
7030)93 "provides that nothing contained in Title VII 'shall be inter-
preted to require any employer... to grant preferential treatment.., to
any group because of the race.., of such.., group on account of' a de
facto racial imbalance in the employer's work force." But section 7030)
does not state that title VII cannot be interpreted to permit such volun-




90. Id. at 199-200. The relevant portions of § 703(a) and (d) of title VII are as follows:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's race... ; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or other-
wise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race....
(d) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor organization, or joint
labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, includ-
ing on-the-job training programs to discriminate against any individual because of his race...
in admission to, or employment in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or other
training.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (d) (1982).
91. Weber, 443 U.S. at 200.
92. Id. at 201.
93. Id. at 204. The Court noted that Congress designed title VII "to break down old patterns
of racial segregation and hierarchy, stating that it was... structured to open employment opportuni-
ties for Blacks in occupations which have been traditionally closed to them." Id. at 208, (quoting
110 CONG. REc. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)).
94. The relevant portion of § 7030) of title VII is as follows:
(0) Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer, employ-
ment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee subject to this sub-
chapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race...
of such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the
total number or percentage of persons of any race.., employed by any employer, referred or
11
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on the permissible side of the line between permissible and impermissible
affirmative action plans.95 The Court refused to disclose what entails a
generally permissible or impermissible affirmative action plan. However,
Justice Brennan laid out several factors that made the Kaiser plan a per-
missible one: (1) the plan does not unnecessarily trammel the interests of
the white employees; (2) the plan is temporary; (3) the plan is designed to
eliminate a manifest racial imbalance, and; (4) the plan is used in tradi-
tionally segregated jobs.9 6
The last case comprising the trilogy of numerical relief enforcement
cases is Fullilove v. Klutznick.97 In Fullilove, plaintiffs, a group of con-
struction contractors and subcontractors, and a firm engaged in heating,
ventilation, and air conditioning work98 facially challenged the constitu-
tionality of a congressional spending program.99 Section 103(f)(2) of the
1977 Act (MBE provision)"°° provided that "absent an administrative
waiver, 10% of the federal funds granted for local public works projects
must be used by the State or local grantees to procure services or supplies
from businesses owned and controlled by members of statutorily identi-
fied minority groups." 10 1 Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief to enjoin enforcement of the MBE provision" 2 alleg-
ing that the enforcement of the ten percent MBE requirement caused
them economic injury. 10 3 They further alleged that the MBE provision
facially "violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment and the equal protection component of the due process clause of
the fifth amendment."'"
The Court noted that Congress determined that the present effects of
classified for employment by any employment agency or labor organization, admitted to mem-
bership or classified by any labor organization, or admitted to, or employed in, any apprentice-
ship or other training program, in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of
such race... in any community, State, section, or other area...
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
95. Weber, 443 U.S. at 205-06.
96. Id. at 208.
97. Id.
98. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). This is a fourteenth amendment case wherein the Court combined the
permissible race element in Bakke and the Brennan factors laid down in Weber to uphold a federal
statute that contained a race conscious numerical relief remedy.
99. Id. at 455.
100. Id. at 453. This congressional spending program is provided for in Public Works Employ-
ment Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6710 (1982).
101. A bona fide Minority Business Enterprise (MBE) is a business where at least fifty percent of
it is owned by minority group members, or where at least fifty percent of the stock of a publicly
owned business is owned by minority group members. Fullilve, 448 U.S. at 454.
102. Id. The statutorily identified minority groups are 'citizens of the United States who are
Black, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts." Id.
103. Id. at 455.
104. The plaintiffs basically challenged the fact that "contracts would be awarded to available,
qualified, bona fide MBE's even though they ... would not be the lowest competitive bidders, so long
as their higher bids, when challenged, were found to reflect merely attempts to cover costs inflated by
the present effects of prior disadvantage and discrimination." Id. at 481.
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past discrimination have impaired the competitive position of minority
owned and controlled businesses."0 5 The purpose of the MBE provision
was to remedy this situation.10 6 Chief Justice Burger writing for a di-
vided Court,1"7 rejected the plaintiff's economic injury claims and consti-
tutional challenges. In upholding the validity of the MBE provision he
stated, "It is not a constitutional defect for an affirmative action ...
program... to disappoint the expectations of non-minority firms. When
effectuating a limited and properly tailored remedy to cure the effects of
prior discrimination, such a 'sharing of the burden' by innocent parties is
... [permissible]." 8  As to the racial and ethnic criteria used in the
MBE provision, the Chief Justice reasoned that the program "provides a
reasonable assurance that application of racial or ethnic criteria will be
limited to accomplishing the remedial objectives of Congress ... ."109
Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion upholding the MBE provision,
stated in more definite Weber terms that the set-aside is temporary, and
the effect of the set-aside does not unnecessarily trammel innocent
whites' ability to compete for the vast majority of construction funds.110
Justice Powell noted that Congress, being a competent body, did make
findings of past racial discrimination.
B. Affirmative Action Through Title VII
Federal affirmative action programs designed to prevent racial dis-
crimination in employment had their beginnings in anti-discrimination
executive orders. 1' The first such order was number 880212 signed by
President Roosevelt on June 25, 1941. Executive order 8802 was Presi-
dent Roosevelt's response to Black American protests and was designed
to prevent A. Phillip Randolph's planned march on Washington." 3 Ex-
ecutive order 8802 was mere "lip service" to the monumental problem of
providing equal employment opportunity for all races of people. The ex-
105. Id. at 455.
106. Id. at 487.
107. Id. at 513.
108. Chief Justice Burger's opinion received only three votes from the Court, the same number
as Justice Marshall's opinion received. Because Chief Justice Burger's opinion embraced a tougher
standard of review than did Justice Marshall's, Chief Justice Burger's opinion is considered by many
to be controlling. An analysis that would satisfy Chief Justice Burger's standard would automati-
cally satisfy that of Justice Marshall.
109. Id. at 484.
110. Id. at 487.
111. Id. at 513-15.
112. The first use of the term "affirmative action" came about early in the federal government's
development of trade union regulations for private sector employment practices. However, the regu-
lations did not involve discrimination, but were concerned with the rights of trade union members.
See generally National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982); Republic Steel Corp.
v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940). See also CITIZENS' COMM'N, supra note 4, at 29.
113. CITIZENS' COMM'N, supra note 4, at 32-33.
13
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ecutive order provided prohibitions for racial discrimination in employ-
ment but lacked an enforcement mechanism.
1 14
Although the Supreme Court ushered in the "beginning to the end" of
governmentally sanctioned discrimination in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion115 decision in 1954,116 no broad civil rights legislation was enacted in
the fifties.117 This was mainly due to the fact that President Eisenhower
"did not believe that discrimination generally could be eliminated by
law."
1 1 8
President Kennedy initiated the drafting of the Civil Rights Act of
1964."' Originally, title VII of the Act was weak. 2' Although Ken-
nedy's assassination bolstered the Act's chances for passage, 21 the dili-
gent efforts of President Johnson finally ensured its enactment.122 Public
reaction to white racial violence in the sixties contributed to the passage
of the Act. 23 In 1963, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. led the long awaited
civil rights "march on Washington." Within a year Congress enacted
title VII, its first comprehensive response to the problem of employment
discrimination.
124
Title VII is the unlawful employment practices section of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.125 One of title VII's main goals was "to break down
old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy" 126 and was structured in
such a way as to "open employment opportunities for [Blacks] in occupa-
tions which have been traditionally closed to them."'127 Congress' pri-
114. The executive order "declared that there shall be no discrimination on the basis of race,
creed, color, or national origin in employment industries engaged in defense production." Id. The
only hint of an enforcement mechanism within the executive order was that the order "required
agencies and departments to include in their defense contracts a clause under which the contractors
would pledge nondiscrimination in employment in the government project." Id.
115. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ("separate but equal" held unconstitutional).
116. 3 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DIsCRIMINATION § 66.44, at 12-36 (1984).
117. Id. at 12-37.
118. Id. Eisenhower "belonged to the 'hearts and minds' school of thought: to erase discrimina-
tion, you must first change people's hearts and minds, and, until you do, legislation cannot do the
job." Id.
However, in 1957, President Eisenhower did push through Congress the Civil Rights Act of 1957
which created the Civil Rights Commission and the Civil Rights Division in the Justice Department.
Id.
119. Id. at 12-38.
120. Id. "Title VII as originally proposed ... merely supplied congressional authorization for
the government contracts program that was already operating under an executive order." Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 12-39. In 1957 President Johnson, then Senate Majority Leader, was firmly against
all civil rights legislation. Id. He tried to block the passage of Eisenhower's 1957 civil rights legisla-
tion. Id. at 12-38.
123. 3 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, supra note 116, § 66.44, at 12-36.
124. See CrrIzENs' COMM'N, supra note 4, at 39.
125. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701-716, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
126. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979).
127. Id. (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 6548 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). Judge J. Skelly
Wright expressed the purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as follows:
14
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mary concern in enacting the prohibition against racial discrimination in
Title VII... was with 'the plight of [Blacks] in our economy.' "128 "In
1947, the non-white unemployment rate was only 64% higher than the
white rate; in 1962, because of automation it was 124% higher."
1 29
With executive order 11246,130 President Johnson created the Office of
Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) in 1965. Through the OFCC,
equal employment opportunity programs for federal contractors were in-
stitutionalized."' The first use of numerical employment goals to rem-
edy and prevent discrimination was in 1967 when the OFCC announced
its affirmative action program for Cleveland, Ohio. 13 2 In 1972 Congress
authorized civil suits under title VII by the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission (EEOC) through an amendment to title VII.133
The above account illustrates that the federal government has made
great strides to develop workable solutions to the equal employment op-
portunity problem. However, President Reagan's Justice Department
has embarked upon a course of action 13 4 and embraced an interpretation
The purpose of the legislation cannot be denied: to help blacks and members of other minority
groups overcome the prejudice that oppresses them. Its effect is to give special advantage to
those minority groups. To call such legislation 'color-blind' is a meaningless abstraction. Legis-
lation against invidious discrimination helps one race and not the other because one race and
not the other needs such help.
Wright, Color-Blind Theories and Color-Conscious Remedies, 47 U. CHi. L. REV. 213, 220-21 (1980).
Judge J. Skelly Wright sits on the bench of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Justice Department has asked the Supreme Court in several certiorari petitions for review to
adopt a 'color-blind' interpretation of the Constitution. See Kilpatrick, Toward A Color-Blind Con-
stitution, Durham Morning Herald, Sept. 3, 1985, at A5, col. 1.
128. Weber, 443 U.S. at 202. Whites have standing to sue under title VII under McDonald v.
Santa Fe Trail Transp., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
129. Weber, 443 U.S. at 202 (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 6547 (1964) (remarks of Sen.
Humphrey)).
130. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1965), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, at 28 (1982),
amended by, Exec. Order No. 11,345, C.F.R. 654 (1967), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, at 28
(1982).
131. CrrizENs' COMM'N, supra note 4, at 40.
132. Id. at 43.
133. Id. at 51.
The EEOC has outlined three circumstances under which voluntary affirmative action is appro-
priate: (1) where analysis of an employer's employment practices reveals facts constituting ac-
tual or potential adverse impact; (2) to correct the effects of prior discriminatory practices; or
(3) if because of historic restrictions by employers, labor organizations, and others, the availabil-
ity pool, particularly of qualified minorities .... employment or promotional opportunities is
artificially limited.
Id. at 63.
134. "Since December 1984 the Justice Department has sought to persuade or coerce more than
40 cities, counties and states to seek elimination of court-imposed... numerical relief governing
hiring and promotion of public employees. Most of the ... numerical relief originally had been
imposed at the request of the Justice Department under earlier presidents." Charlotte News, Aug.
16, 1985, at A3, col. 4. At least one state, North Carolina, took heed of the Justice Department's
urgings. Under Governor Jim Martin, the state is in the process of dismantling its affirmative action
plans for public employees. See The Salisbury Post, April 7, 1985, at C13, col. 1; The Salisbury Post,
May 16, 1985, at A8, col. 1. In its attempt to dismantle the progress made by the federal govern-
ment in overcoming the equal employment opportunity problem, the Reagan Administration has
15
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of title VII's purpose so as to make the Act a complete nullity. 135
III. THE DEMARCATION
The foregoing "trilogy" discussion seems to suggest that numerical re-
lief enforcement under title VII and the fourteenth amendment are
"close cousins."' 136 Lower federal courts, in decisions such as Williams v.
New Orleans,137 and Bratton v. City of Detroit,131 consistently have ex-
pressed this "close cousins" analysis in cases involving racial discrimina-
tion in employment. In Williams and Bratton, the courts used the "close
cousins" analysis in deciding a title VII and a fourteenth amendment
dispute, respectively.
139
A legal observer reasonably may take note of the "close cousins" anal-
yses emanating from the "trilogy" and subsequent lower federal court
decisions to assume that if the "trilogy" created "close cousins" in an
attempt to bolster numerical relief enforcement, then when the "tril-
ogy's" creator1" limits one cousin, the same limitation should therefore
adopted various avenues of attack. One tactic is where the Justice Department attempts to repudiate
consent decrees that they themselves have previously signed. See Durham Morning Herald, Sept. 5,
1985, at A9, col. 4. Another, highly damaging tactic is that "the White House staff has drafted an
executive order rescinding rules that require government contractors... to set numerical goals for
minorities and women." Pear, Hiring Goals Might Be Rescinded, The Charlotte Observer, Aug. 15,
1985, at Al, col. 5.
135. The Justice Department has embraced an interpretation of title VII that would require
relief under the title to be given only to victims of actual discrimination. See Williams v. City of
New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc). For a court to adopt the Justice Depart-
ment's requirement of actual victim discrimination under title VII would create an almost impossible
standard, due to the type of evidence that would be required and its obvious unavailability. See id. at
1572 n.6 (Wisdom, J., dissenting). It is interesting to note that the Justice Department could not
convince the eleven federal circuits to adopt this actual victim standard.
136. The term "close cousins" is used here in an attempt to conceptualize the nexus between the
title VII and fourteenth amendment modes of numerical relief enforcement. The term denotes the
fact that some courts, including the Supreme Court, have used factors from both modes in an at-
tempt to settle disputes in employment discrimination. See infra notes 140 and 143 and accompany-
ing text. The primary ("trilogy") Supreme Court decisions used in deciding the validity of numerical
relief are: Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (a fourteenth amendment case
that recognized the use of race as a factor in affirmative action programs); United Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (a title VII case upholding the use of a racial hiring goal in voluntary
situations pursuant to certain given factors); and, Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (a
fourteenth amendment case that combined the race element in Bakke and the factors laid down in
Weber to uphold a federal statute that contained race-conscious numerical relief).
137. 729 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
138. 704 F.2d 878 (6th Cir.) (en banc); 712 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1983), cerL denied, 464 U.S. 1040
(1984).
139. Both Williams and Bratton used "theory intermingling" of title VII and fourteenth amend-
ment principles in the disposition of racial discrimination suits. Williams is a title VII decision,
using a combination of factors taken from United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (title
VII), and Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (fourteenth amendment). Williams, 729 F.2d
at 1560-64. Bratton, a fourteenth amendment decision, recognized that title VII and the fourteenth
amendment may employ different analyses. However, the court combined the two analyses for pur-
poses of resolving the dispute in this fourteenth amendment decision. Bratton, 704 F.2d at 887.
140. The term "creator" refers to the particular court that rendered the judicial decision.
16
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 2 [1985], Art. 6
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol15/iss2/6
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
apply to the other cousin. However, the legal observer's assumption is
erroneous, because the limitations placed on title VII by Stotts do not
apply to the fourteenth amendment. The corollary of such an erroneous
assumption is, pursuant to DPOA II and Stotts, that the Stotts decision
represents a dismantling of the "close cousins" approach to numerical
relief enforcement.
Stotts, an employment discrimination decision, involves liability under
title VII. In Stotts, the Court held that a consent decree, entered into
out-of-court without any findings or admissions of racial discrimination,
cannot override a bona fide seniority system under title VII. 141 Instead
of using a "close cousins" analysis in the disposition of the case, the
Court chose to use a pure statutory interpretation analysis. The Court
did not pay "lip-service" to the "trilogy." Therefore, the question now
presented is whether Stotts demarcated the "close cousins" theory be-
tween the title VII and fourteenth amendment modes of numerical relief
enforcement. In substance, DPOA II answered the demarcation question
in the affirmative.
DPOA II, an employment discrimination decision, involved liability
under the fourteenth amendment. The question in DPOA II was whether
a consent decree supported by (1) judicial findings of invidious racial dis-
crimination and (2) admissions of such discrimination by the discrimi-
nating party can override a bona fide seniority clause under the
fourteenth amendment. The DPOA I1 court answered this question in
the affirmative.14 The City-defendants, who very well could be our
mythical legal observer, claimed that Stotts was mandatory authority in
racial discrimination in employment actions, pursuant to the fourteenth
amendment. 143 Therefore, claimed the City, a consent decree cannot
override a bona fide seniority clause even under the fourteenth amend-
ment. 144 The court, in an attempt to dispel the notion that the limits put
upon title VII numerical relief enforcement by Stotts applies equally well
to fourteenth amendment numerical relief enforcement, distinguished
Stotts from fourteenth amendment (DPOA 11) situations. In DPOA II,
Judge Gilmore stated that "Stotts involved a consent decree that specifi-
cally disclaimed liability for past discrimination. [DPOA II] ... involves
prior judicial determinations of past intentional [racial] discrimina-
tion."'14 ' The court reasoned further that Stotts was not controlling, be-
cause the case involved only title VII which specifically provides an
exemption for bona fide seniority clauses.'" Judge Gilmore surmised
141. See Stotts, 104 S. Ct. at 2585-90.
142. DPOA II, 591 F.2d at 1202.
143. See generally id. at 1202-03.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1202.
146. Id. at 1202-03.
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that DPOA I1 involves only interpretations of the fourteenth amendment,
which does not contain exemptions for any type seniority clause.147
Therefore, reasoned the court, Stotts does not control in a fourteenth
amendment situation. 148
Both Stotts and DPOA II involved a voluntary affirmative action plan's
use in overriding a bona fide seniority system despite the objections of a
public employer. However, the two decisions contain contradictory
holdings if viewed from a "close cousins" point of reference. Thus, Stotts
demarcated the title VII and fourteenth amendment modes of numerical
relief enforcement. However, the demarcation was limited to a court's
authority in overriding bona fide seniority clauses, by consent decrees,
over a public employer's objections.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Stotts apparently has defined the boundaries of
affirmative action-numerical relief enforcement pursuant to title VII, at
least in situations where public employers are forced to override bona
fide seniority clauses, by consent decrees. Under title VII, absent express
provisions stating so, a court cannot force a modification of a consent
decree to override a bona fide seniority clause unless it finds that the
seniority clause is tainted with discrimination or that discrimination has
victimized an identified person.
The Court in Stotts did not address any constitutional issues, but
DPOA 1H seems correctly to have read this silence as being a green light
to continued modification of consent decrees, pursuant to the fourteenth
amendment. The main qualification is that there must be findings of in-
tentional discrimination by a competent body. The new problem created
is that victims will be forced to take their claims of discrimination into
court and not settle them out-of-court. A discriminating employer's
legal theory need only include (1) a budgetary shortfall, whether self-
created or not, and (2) a pre-existing seniority system that is neutral on
its face as to race. The foregoing point was demonstrated in the Stotts
decision.
The main thrust of the DPOA H1 decision is that employers have an
affirmative obligation to eliminate identified racial discrimination in the
work place. 49 This obligation is commensurate to the obligation im-
posed upon the Nation's educational systems to eliminate the dual, race-
based school systems in the early 1950's, by the Supreme Court's Brown
147. Id. at 1201-02.
148. See id. at 1201-03.
149. DPOA I1, 591 F.2d at 120104.
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decisions;150 and, the obligation imposed upon the States to open their
electorial processes to blacks by such Court decisions as Harper v. Vir-
ginia Board of Elections"' and Rogers v. Lodge.
1 52
MICHAEL L. KING
150. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II); Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I).
151. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
152. 458 U.S. 613 (1982).
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